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We consider a model with two types of households: the poor with no initial endowment 
and the rich with positive endowment, and two types of assets: properties in a poor 
area and properties in a rich area. In the model, poor agents need credit to buy an asset, 
whereas the rich can draw from their endowment. We show that credit-fueled housing 
bubbles sometimes may improve welfare, making the poorer individuals better off. 
More precisely, there exist two types of equilibria in both property markets: one is a 
bubble equilibrium, and the other is an equilibrium where asset prices are stable over 
time. While the poor always obtain a positive surplus in the bubble equilibrium, this is 
not necessarily true for the rich. Our results suggest that there may be scope for market 
interventions aimed at sustaining the value of assets held by credit-constrained agents 
after the burst of a credit bubble.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The years preceding The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) witnessed unprecedented 
access to credit for low income individuals with little or no credit history. This 
was partly facilitated by government-sponsored institutions like Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, whose main task was to incentivize banks to extend the credit base 
by buying securitized loans from commercial banks, especially subprime loans. 
Later, after the GFC , the US Government was criticized for this policy, which was 
considered one of the fundamental reasons for the credit-fueled housing bubble 
(especially the subprime bubble). This paper tests whether credit-fueled bubbles—
where the price of an asset is above the fundamental value—sometimes make poor 
agents (subprime borrowers) better off and improve welfare. The argument relies 
on the idea that asset price bubbles can improve intergenerational allocation of 
resources in the presence of financial frictions, such as borrowing constraints. 
In principle, the bubble may make the poor better off through various channels. 
One such channel is short-term borrowing. When the house owned by a poor 
individual gains value, it can be used as collateral to start a business. For example, 
consider a scenario where the poor with access to good investment opportunities 
require short-term credit. If house prices are high (overvalued), the poor may be 
able to collateralize the house and borrow, whereas if their houses are significantly 
underpriced they may not be able to access credit at all. This argument is similar 
to Tirole (1985), who argues that even if bubbles crowd out total investment, they 
still may improve the flow and allocation of funds through relaxing the borrowing 
constraint for investors with a good investment opportunity, that is, the bubble 
can lead to a Pareto improvement.
Another channel is mobility. With the possibility of selling their houses at 
a high price, poor households can enjoy higher socio-economic and geographic 
mobility. Consider, for instance, a scenario where a homeowner may want to 
move to a better neighborhood. If his property is overvalued, it can be sold or 
collateralized to obtain credit to purchase a property in the new neighborhood. 
However, mobility is instead hindered if the assets owned by the poor are 
significantly underpriced. A branch of the mobility literature shows that mobility 
is negatively affected when house prices fall due to negative equity. Being trapped 
in negative equity due to a significant decrease in house prices is called a “lock-in 
effect” (Ferreira, Gyourko, and Tracy, 2010).
We consider a model with two types of households: the poor (with no initial 
endowment) and the rich (with some endowment), and two types of assets: a 
house in a poor area (a poor asset) and a house in a rich area (a rich asset). In 
the model, poor agents need credit to buy an asset, whereas the rich can draw 
from their endowment. In other words, the poor need a 100% loan-to-value (LTV) 
mortgage (can be thought of as subprime loans), whereas the rich can provide 
some down payment. Thus, the equilibrium price for the poor asset is determined 
by the availability of credit. We show that there exist two types of equilibria for 
houses in the poor region. One of them is a bubble equilibrium, which exists if 
credit growth is sufficiently large, that is, a credit-fueled bubble. The other is an 
equilibrium where the asset price is stable over time but the asset is significantly 
underpriced. Under the bubble scenario, prices grow fast enough such that the 
poor who purchased the asset not only can pay back their debt by selling the asset 
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when old, but also enjoy a positive surplus. Under the no-bubble scenario, credit 
growth is small, implying that price growth is not large enough to enable agents to 
pay back their debt by selling the asset in the future. Thus, in the no-bubble case, 
the equilibrium price will be zero, that is, the asset is significantly underpriced. 
The implication of this result is that the bubble scenario makes the poor better 
off and improves welfare.2 For the rich asset market, there are also two types of 
equilibria: a bubble equilibrium and a no-bubble equilibrium with a price at the 
fundamental value. In the rich asset market, the price is bounded below by the 
fundamental value, since the rich can always purchase the asset by paying from 
their endowment. This, in contrast, is not true for the poor asset, which is always 
underpriced in the absence of bubbles.
To analyze welfare, we consider an extension where both poor and rich assets 
depreciate through time. We consider a supplier who can build new houses, 
whenever the price of the house is higher than the cost. In that case, when the 
poor asset is underpriced (zero price), the supplier will not find it profitable to 
build new houses in the poor neighborhood. Thus, over time, the total stock of 
poor assets will decrease due to depreciation. In contrast, if there is a bubble in the 
poor market, the supplier will build new houses, keeping the total stock of assets 
stable. Comparing these two scenarios, the bubble brings a welfare improvement 
by stabilizing the total stock of poor assets.
One important empirical implication of this model is that bubbles grow 
faster in the poor market than in the rich market. Moreover, if at any point in 
time the 100% LTV policy is abandoned, there will be a mass default among the 
poor. The intuition of both results is due to poor agents having zero initial wealth 
and their dependence on credit.3 Figures 1 and 2 show the Case–Shiller Home 
price indexes for both high- and low-tier classes since 1994 for San Francisco and 
Miami, respectively.4 It is evident that bubbles in low-tier home markets are much 
more pronounced compared to the high-tier.5 These figures provide anecdotal 
evidence to motivate our result that housing bubbles may be more pronounced for 
assets owned by the poor due to poor home buyers’ greater dependence on credit 
growth. Consequently, downturns affect the low-tier housing market more than 
the high-tier, that is, price volatility in the poor housing market is higher. In terms 
of policy, our results suggest that there may be scope for market interventions 
aimed at sustaining the value of assets held by credit-constrained agents after the 
burst of a credit bubble.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section II reviews the literature. Section III 
outlines the model, and Section IV characterizes the equilibria. Section V sets forth 
extensions of the model. Section VI draws conclusions and implications for policy.
2 However, there is a risk that if the bubble bursts, there may be widespread defaults among the 
poor. We comment on this issue in the extension section below.
3 As discussed in the conclusion, the zero-wealth assumption is just to make the main point clearer to 
illustrate. Otherwise, one can consider a model where the poor have some wealth, but significantly 
a smaller amount than the wealth of the rich. That model will also bring similar results qualitatively 
as long as the poor and the rich differ from each other significantly enough.
4 See Figures 7, 8, and 9 in the Appendix for Los Angeles, New York, and Tampa.
5 For San Francisco and Miami, the difference between the low and high classes seems to be much 
more significant.
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II. RELATED LITERATURE
Bubbles are studied extensively in the literature and have attracted the attention 
of economists, academics, and policymakers due to their consequences on the 
allocation of resources. This section presents an overview of the vast literature on 
this topic without presenting a detailed discussion. Although there is no consensus 
among economists on the definition of the term “bubble,” one can define a bubble 
as sustained mispricing of an asset. Not every mispricing can be considered a 
bubble however. The term bubble refers to a period in which investors believe 
that price growth will continue, so they hold the asset at the ongoing price—even 
though it seems to be overvalued—since they believe that the asset can be sold at 
a higher price in the future.6
The literature describes various theoretical explanations for bubbles.7 One 
strand of models is the rational expectations models, where agents have identical 
information (Martin and Ventura, 2012; Galí, 2014). Considering the possibility of 
speculation when traders are assumed to have rational expectations, Tirole (1982) 
derives the conditions under which bubbles can be ruled out. This author shows 
that at least one of the following four conditions must be violated to sustain a 
bubble (Barlevy, 2015): (i) the number of potential traders is finite; (ii) all traders 
are assumed to be rational, which is common knowledge; (iii) traders should hold 
common prior beliefs about the environment; and (iv) resources are allocated 
efficiently ex-ante, before the trade. Rational bubbles can exist under restrictive 
theoretical conditions. Blanchard (1979) shows that it is consistent to have bubbles 
followed by market crashes under rational expectations. This author also claims 
that detecting these bubbles seems to be quite difficult. Diba and Grossman (1988) 
show, due to free disposal, that negative rational bubbles are ruled out. These 
authors also show that a positive bubble can start only at the first trading day of a 
stock and a burst rational bubble cannot restart. The present study complements 
the literature in the sense that it does not focus on the conditions under which a 
rational bubble exists, but on its welfare implications.
Another strand of literature considers asymmetric information bubbles (or 
heterogeneous belief models) where agents have different information, but based 
on a common prior distribution (Harrison and Kreps, 1978; Allen, Morris, and 
Postlewaite, 1993; Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003; Conlon, 2004; Brunnermeier, 
2008; Conlon, 2015). In these models, prices reflect information but, contrary to 
the symmetric information case, the existence of a bubble may not be common 
knowledge.8 Other literature considers the interaction between well-informed 
sophisticated investors and behavioral investors, who have psychological biases 
(De Long et al., 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Abreu and Brunnermeier, 2002, 
2003). The seminal Shleifer and Vishny (1997) shows that there are limits to 
arbitrage. Although sophisticated investors understand the overpricing, they may 
6 This type of explanation for the bubbles is termed the “greater-fool theory of bubbles” 
(Barlevy (2015)).
7 See Brunnermeier (2008) and Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013) for an overview.
8 As Brunnermeier (2008) mentions, it can be the case that all agents are aware of the over-valuation 
of an asset but not everybody knows that all other investors also know of this fact. “This lack of 
higher-order mutual knowledge” allows for the possibility of the existence of finite bubbles. See 
also Allen, Morris, and Postlewaite (1993).
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not be able to trade against the bubble. This “limits to arbitrage” argument implies 
that bubbles can exist, since arbitrageurs cannot drive prices to the fundamental.
The present study is more related to the class of “credit bubble” models, such 
as Allen and Gale (2000). These authors present a model built on a risk shifting 
argument. Investors, having limited liability, borrow from banks and bid up 
asset prices. When the value of their investment turns out to be low, they simply 
default and walk away. Barlevy (2014) develop a credit-driven bubble model 
to investigate the possible empirical patterns that can be used as indicators of 
bubbles. This author suggests that rapid price appreciation, together with high 
turnover rates and speculative trading, are more likely to take place when assets 
are overvalued. The present study complements the aforementioned literature 
focusing on the policy and welfare implications of housing bubbles, rather than 
the destructive consequences of bubbles or explanations of why bubbles form. Our 
results may explain why the value of assets owned by the poor may depend more 
on credit growth. More importantly, we offer a channel through which bubbles 
may improve the welfare of the poor.
III. THE MODEL
We consider an OLG model where each generation lives for two periods. 
Agents are heterogeneous in their initial endowment. There are two types of agents: 
the rich with an initial endowment A > 0, and the poor with no initial endowment. 
In the economy, there are also two types of assets9 whose consumption generate 
positive utility. More precisely, agent i ∈ {R,P} (R = Rich, P = Poor) derives utility 
ui (aj) from the consumption of asset aj ∈{ aR,aP} when young. There is a continuous 
mass m of poor agents and n of rich agents. Type aR asset represents a residential 
property in a rich area, whereas aP represents a residential property in a poor area. 
Consider a segregated city where the rich live in one neighborhood and the poor 
in the other. We assume that the rich have no intrinsic utility from consumption of 
a property in the poor area. This is just for simplification and, as long as the rich 
value the poor asset less than the poor do, our results follow. Formally, we have 
the following assumption.
Assumption [A1] 
[A1] basically states that rich agents value the rich asset more than poor agents 
and rich agents assign no value for the poor asset.10 In contrast, poor agents derive 
some utility from the poor asset, albeit lower than the utility the rich derive from 
the rich asset.
The assets are fixed in supply. There is a continuum SP of poor assets and SR of 
rich assets. In any period t, the old generation retires and those who hold an asset 
can sell it to a member of the young generation at some price ptj, j= R,P.
9 A durable consumption good like a residential property.
10 The assumption, uR (aP)=0, is just for simplification. It does not affect our results qualitatively as 
long as the above utility ranking holds.
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Each agent, either poor or rich, can purchase no more than one house, either 
as consumers or investors. Moreover, the agents who cannot buy a house obtain 
zero utility.
Assumption [A2] m > SP > n > SR
[A2] helps us to identify equilibrium prices. Specifically, there are more poor 
(rich) agents than the supply of poor (rich) assets such that agents compete to buy 
the assets. The assumption that the supply of poor assets is larger than the mass of 
rich agents ensures that rich agents will not drive prices in the poor asset market, 
even if they may be interested in buying a poor asset for speculative reasons. This 
is discussed in the characterization of the equilibrium in Section IV below.
To simplify the illustration, assume all agents have a discount factor  per 
period.11
IV. CHARACTERIZATION OF EQUILIBRIA
We define the fundamental value of asset aj, j ∈ {R,P} as:
11 Assume that banks borrow from depositors whose discount rate is β and there are enough 
depositors so that the funding cost of banks will be determined by the depositor’s discount factor. 
Considering that the banking sector is competitive, banks will charge . This will imply that the 
opportunity cost of borrowers in the economy is .
As will become clear, in equilibrium, the value of asset aj is entirely determined 
by the demand of type j individuals. We thus simplify the notation by setting 
uP (aP) ≡ uP and uR (aR) ≡ uR.
Consider an equilibrium where banks offer contracts with no initial down 
payment (100% LTV ratio), type i young agents borrow Btj from the bank to buy 
type j asset from the old agents, and the banks demand repayment rBtj, r≥1. Type 
i=R,P agent will buy a property when the following holds:
(1)
(2)
Consider the following environment:
• Banks are competitive, but assume that for each borrower there is an upper 
bound for the credit available . This constraint is relaxed at a rate r2>1, 
i.e., . This borrowing constraint may reflect the total amount of 
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12 We think that this assumption is related to the credit-fueled bubble that resulted in the global 
financial crisis. In that sense, due to either government policies (as was the case in the US) or simply 
due to the banks extending their lending base, there will be some credit growth captured by the 
parameter r2. We place no restriction on the parameter so that any scenario where credit is squeezed 
can also be captured with parameter 0<r2<1. However, in the equilibrium characterization, we 
discuss the cases for r2>1 since our focus is shedding light on credit-fueled bubbles.
13 One can also think of the basic assumption of the classical OLG model, where population grows 
each period at a fixed rate. However, this assumption will be redundant in our model, since, in 
every period, only some young will get the asset and in the next period, when they become old, 
the new generation will keep competing for the asset considering that the mass of assets is always 
less than the young population in each period. Thus, we simply assume that the population is fixed 
each period.
credit available in the economy12 and will be crucial for the determination of 
equilibrium. Whenever the borrower is expected to default, we also assume 
that banks do not lend, so that . This implies that if a bank expects that 
, such that the anticipated price in the next period is not enough to 
cover the repayment, then .
• In each period t, since there are more young than old who own an asset,13 the 
young compete to buy the asset.
Given this environment, consider first the poor asset aP. The poor have no 
initial wealth, so they pay a price such that . Then (2) becomes
Also, the young poor cannot pay an amount greater than the maximum 
borrowing:
(3)
Lemma 1 For the poor asset market, if there exists a borrowing equilibrium 
with Bt>0, then price grows at rate r or higher to avoid default, i.e., . This 
implies that agents obtain a positive surplus, i.e., (2) does not bind.
Proof. In the model, there are two constraints for a young poor agent: the 
borrowing constraint  (4) and the willingness-to-buy constraint (WTBP) 
(2). Due to competition among the young, at any period at least one of these 
two constraints should bind (otherwise, if both are slack, one can outbid others 
by paying  where (2) still holds.). The agents do not default in an 
equilibrium since they cannot access credit if they are not expected to pay back 
their debt, i.e.,  if banks expect that . Thus, no-default requires 
. This implies that agents can borrow only if the price of the poor 
asset grows at rate r or higher. In turn, this implies that agents obtain a positive 
surplus since WTBP does not bind. To see this point, note that a binding WTBP 
would imply that agents cannot pay back their debt:
(4)
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(5) then implies that in any equilibrium with positive borrowing, WTBP does not 
bind.
Lemma 2 Suppose [A1] and [A2] hold. Then, in the poor asset market:
i. If r2 ≥ r, there exists an equilibrium with prices  and  
in any consecutive periods. Poor agents who hold an asset obtain a positive 
surplus, (2) holds with strict inequality, and there are no defaults in equilibrium.
ii. If r2 < r, there is a unique equilibrium with price ptP = 0 in every period.
Comparing equilibria (i) and (ii), the poor are better off under (i).
Proof. Lemma 1 shows that in equilibrium, (4) must bind due to competition 
among the young (since WTBP is slack). Thus, in case (i), the young must borrow 
up to the maximum in equilibrium. Then, equilibrium prices are  and 
. Since r2 ≥ r, we have , implying that agents 
can pay back their debt and there are no defaults in equilibrium.
A slack in (2) implies that the young who hold an asset obtain a positive 
surplus:
(5)
Note that there may also exist no bubble equilibria with prices ptP = 0,∀t, if 
agents expect  at any point in time. The proof is similar to 
the one provided below.
We now check whether the rich have an incentive to buy the poor asset when 
r2 ≥ r. Even though they derive no utility, if r2 < r, the rich may also buy the poor 
asset to speculate on price growth. But Assumption [A2] indicates that they cannot 
drive prices, since the mass of the poor asset is bigger than the mass of rich agents. 
Thus, the marginal buyer is poor and the equilibrium is as established above.
For case (ii), again, as proved above, if there exists a borrowing equilibrium 
BtP>0, it has to be . However, considering that r2 < r, , 
this implies that the old cannot pay back their debt and default. But, then expecting 
a default, banks will never give credit, i.e., . Thus, the only equilibrium 
involves ptP = 0, ∀t.
Now suppose the rich buy the poor asset. Again since SP > n, the marginal 
buyer is a poor agent and thus the previous argument applies.14
Comparing the two cases (i) and (ii), in (i) the surplus from purchasing an asset 
is bigger than that of case (ii). The reason for this is that, when there is a bubble, 
agents enjoy an excess surplus, on top of the utility they get from consumption, 
considering that price growth is bigger than the repayment to the bank. Formally, 
(6)
14 Note that, when r2<r, the rich do not have speculative incentives to buy the poor asset, since uR 
(aP)=0, whereas the poor derive a positive utility even though the price is zero. Thus, even without 
the assumption SP>n, the marginal buyer is a poor agent.
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15 Note that for the poor, the price is equal to the borrowing pt=Bt and pt+1=Bt+1. Thus, (2) can also be 
represented in the graph by Bt+1≥rBt-u.
Note that here not all young agents obtain an asset. Thus it should be the case 
that there will be some credit rationing.










Figures 3 and 4 provide a graphical illustration of the arguments. Figure 3 
represents the constraints for the poor when r2 ≥ r. The red lines represent the 
two main constraints: WTBP (2) and the borrowing constraint (4). Rearranging (2), 
we get pt+1 ≥ rpt-uP.15 The area above this red line represents the willingness-to-
buy constraint for the poor (WTBP). The area on the left-side of  represents the 
borrowing (resource) constraint. Note that, as proved in Lemma 1, in equilibrium 
WTBP (2) does not bind considering the no-default condition. Thus, the equilibrium 
must lie in the area above the blue dotted line rpt, which represents the no-default 
condition. Due to competition among the young, an equilibrium has to be on the 
dashed-yellow/red line, i.e., the borrowing constraint binds,  (since WTBP is 
slack). But this means that, for the next period, the borrowing constraint also binds 
. Thus, the equilibrium is at point E*.
The figure illustrates constraints for the poor when r2 ≥ r.
the surplus under case (i) is , where the gain from the price growth 
is positive  for r2 > r. Whereas the surplus under case (ii) is  since 
. Then, comparing the surpluses we get:
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Note that the (0,0) point in Figure 3 can be also sustained as a no-bubble 
equilibrium, as long as agents expect the next generation not to borrow (i.e., if 
agents expect no positive price in the next period) and the price will stay at zero.






rPt rpt - u
r2Pt
Bt Pt
Figure 4 shows the case where r2 < r. The no-default region is shown by the 
shaded grey area, and the red lines, the binding constraints (2) and (4), are in the 
default region. Thus, the equilibrium is at pt = pt+1 = 0. To see that this is indeed the 
unique equilibrium, consider a point C on the shaded region. But C is off the WTBP, 
i.e., pt+1 > rpt - u, so that borrowers obtain a positive surplus. In turn, competition 
among the borrowers implies that the borrowing constraint must be binding. 
Otherwise, borrowers would have chosen to borrow more to secure the asset. 
However, any  is outside the shaded region, so that default would have 
occurred. But then, expecting a default, banks will supply no credit. As a result, 
 and the only equilibrium involves pt = pt+1 = 0, ∀t.
As stated above in Lemma 2, there are two main cases in the poor asset market:
i. For r2≥r, the young bid the price up to the borrowing limit  and 
, thus implying that price grows at rate r2 every period. 
Under this equilibrium, young poor individuals can pay back their debt, 
since price growth is fast enough. Thus, there is a bubble equilibrium and for 
individuals who bought a house ((2)) holds with strict inequality. The price 
fetched by the asset in the second period of an agent’s life is used to repay 
the principal plus the interest of the loan borrowed . Banks break even 
and there are no defaults. Under this parametric case, rich agents may also 
have an incentive to buy the poor asset—even though they derive no intrinsic 
utility from it—since price growth is large enough for them to speculate on the 
bubble. As discussed in the above proof, rich agents’ demand does not drive 
The figure shows poor asset market equilibrium when r2 < r.
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prices, since the mass of rich agents is smaller than the mass of poor assets 
available in the economy. As a result, the marginal buyer is a poor agent.
ii. For r2 < r, the borrowing constraint is relaxed at a rate smaller than the cost 
of borrowing r, thus implying that even if the poor agent buys the asset by 
borrowing up to the maximum, price growth is still not large enough to cover 
the repayment in the next period; i.e., the price fetched by the asset in the 
second period of life  is lower than the repayment, . This implies that if 
an agent borrows and purchases a house, the agent will default when old. Thus, 
the poor asset is not traded at a positive price and there will be an equilibrium 
where the asset price is below the fundamental, namely ptP = 0, in every period. 
In this scenario, no rich agent will have an incentive to buy the asset.
The above discussion implies that there are two types of equilibria for the 
poor housing market depending on the credit available in the economy. If there is 
strong credit growth in the economy (case i.), there will be a bubble equilibrium 
where agents who buy a house obtain positive surplus (WTBP(2) holds with strict 
inequality). If there is not enough credit growth in the economy (case ii.), then, in 
equilibrium, the poor asset is significantly underpriced (the equilibrium price is 
below the fundamental).
Now, consider the rich asset, aR:
Different from the poor, rich agents have an endowment A, which can be used to 
buy a house.
The rich again have two constraints: the willingness-to-buy constraint (WTBR)
and the resource constraint
(7)
The rich can pay a down payment Dt and borrow Bt to buy the house, so that 
the price of the rich asset is ptR = Bt + Dt. Below, we focus on the case where the 
down payment is the same in each period, Dt = Dt+1 = D,16 so that the price is:
(8)
16 Note that there can be other equilibria where Dt≠D and it grows each period. We restrict attention 
to a case where, under a bubble, the rich compete for the asset and, after some point, due to an 
increase in price, they have to pay their entire endowment. Thus, even though at the initial periods 
Dt<D, after some period, the young rich need to pay D to ensure buying the asset.
Thus, the willingness-to-buy constraint (WTBR) (7) can be written as:
(9)
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17 Note that we denote uR=uR (aR) for the rest of the paper.
18 Note that still there may be a no-bubble equilibrium even if A<FR. This is proved in Lemma (4).
and when the maximum is borrowed  we obtain17
(10)
First, we need to check whether there can be an equilibrium where rich agents 
do not borrow, Bt = 0, and simply pay from their initial endowment so that there is 
no bubble, ptR = pt+1 = D.
Lemma 3 If , then there exists an equilibrium without borrowing, 
 and Bt* = 0. If A < FR; thus, in equilibrium, it must be Bt* > 0 
(whenever ).
Proof. In any equilibrium, at least one of the constraints (7) or (8) must bind due 
to the competition among the young (as buyers). Now, consider an equilibrium 
where the young do not borrow and pay down payment D so that in each period 
the price equals the down payment,  . However, this means that the 
resource constraint (8) is slack (since agents do not borrow). Thus, (7) must bind, 
which implies:
(11)
The second part of the lemma follows from the fact that if A<FR, then WTBR does 
not bind, so the resource constraint must bind.
Lemma (3) basically states that, if the endowment A is big enough, there exists 
an equilibrium where the rich asset is traded at the fundamental value without 
any bubble (and the price is stable). If the initial endowment is small, then, similar 
to the poor market, the young borrow to buy the asset, i.e., Bt* > 0 provided that 
.18
Now consider an equilibrium with a positive amount of borrowing. The rich 
have resources A, which can be used to buy the asset. They already paid D ≤ A as 
a downpayment when they were young. Then, when they are old, the no-default 
condition is . Since , rearranging the no-
default condition we get:
Rearranging [WTB_Rich] (WTBR) we get:
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19 Basically, as shown in the Appendix, if the initial wealth of the rich is smaller than this cut-off A, as 
is similar to the poor market, the rich asset will be traded below fundamental, albeit at a positive 
price.
Below, Figures 5 and 6 show these two constraints (12) and (13) for the rich 
when r2 ≥ r and r2 < r, respectively. In both graphs, the dotted blue lines represent the 
no-default conditions and the grey-shaded area presents the pairs (Bt,Bt+1) where 
no default occurs. The red and red dotted lines represent the WTBR for D > FR and 
D = FR, respectively. Note that (13) (WTBR) partially lies within the shaded area for 
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WTBR (D = FR)
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Figure 5. Constraints for the rich when r2 ≥ r
In Figure 5, the maximum borrowing (point E*) is an equilibrium, though 
not unique, where the resource constraint binds and the agents obtain a positive 
surplus. Note that there can be other equilibria (discussed below), such as a point 
on the WTBR where D = FR and Bt+1 = rBt so that agents obtain zero surplus (since 
WTBR binds).
When wealth is smaller than a specific value , then the downpayment 
has to be small as well, since D ≤ A, so that the red line WTBR will lie below the 
default line (the blue dotted line). This case is similar to the poor asset market, 
where agents are wealth constrained. Thus, to have a meaningful difference 
between the poor and the rich, we assume that A is large enough. Lemma 6 in the 
Appendix considers the case where this assumption does not hold.19
The figure illustrates constraints for the rich when r2 ≥ r.
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WTBR (D > FR)
WTBR (D = FR)
Figure 6. Constraints for the rich when r2 < r
Figure 6 represents the constraints that the rich face when the credit growth 
rate is smaller than the borrowing rate, i.e., r2 < r. Considering a candidate bubble 
equilibrium, there are two possible cases, one where WTBR binds and the other 
where the no-default (blue dotted line) binds (when [A3] is violated). However, 
the borrowing level in both these cases (where the equilibrium is on these lines 
and moving up along the lines) cannot be sustainable, since the credit growth rate 
r2 is smaller than the slope of these lines r. Thus, there can exist only steady state 
equilibria (with no bubble) where Bt = Bt+1 = B* and Dt = Dt+1 = D*.
Note that there may be other equilibria where Bt and/or Dt grow at rates that are not 
constant. But we restrict attention to balanced growth paths.
Let  be the initial borrowing limit in period 0.
Lemma 4
Suppose [A1], [A2], and [A3] hold. Then, in the rich asset market,
i. For the case r2 ≥ r;
a) if  or
b) if A≥FR, r2>r and  is sufficiently large,
 then there exist balanced bubble equilibria such that the maximum amount 
is borrowed , and rich agents who hold an asset obtain a positive 
surplus (WTBR (13) is slack). The price is , implying that the 
resource constraint (8) binds.
c) if A ≥ FR, there also exist bubble equilibria where the rich agents obtain no 
surplus in all periods, i.e., WTBR (13) binds.
d) also in all cases, there exist equilibria with no bubble where , 
∀t.
The figure illustrates constraints for the poor when r2 < r.
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ii. If r2 < r, there is no balanced growth path involving a bubble; i.e., there exists 
a continuum of equilibria without a bubble (a steady state) where the asset is 
traded at the fundamental price ptR* = FR, ∀t such that:
a) If A≥FR, then (11) (WTBR) binds and ptR*=p*=B*+D*=FR for D*∈[0,FR] and 
B*∈[0,FR]
b) If A<A<FR, then (11) (WTBR) binds and ptR*=p*=B*+D*=FR for  
and  where .
Proof. We can rewrite the constraints for the rich.  
If WTBR holds with inequality, then competition implies  and Dt=A so that 
, i.e., the resource constraint binds.
Then we can rewrite WTBR as follows: 
However, we know that . Taking the limit for t→∞ shows that (14) 
can hold for all t only if r2 ≥ r. If also , then the resource constraint 
always binds in every bubble equilibrium (and the rich who hold an asset 
experience positive surplus).
Consider then the case where . We need to look at the initial conditions. 
If r2 > r and  is large enough such that WTBR is slack (i.e., (14) holds at time zero), 
then we are back to the case above.
If  is small or r2 = r so that
(14)
then either  or D0 < A, or both.
Whenever , bubble equilibria where WTBR binds are also possible. We 
now construct a bubble equilibrium where WTBR binds.
Suppose that Dt=D is constant and Bt grows as follows
(15),
then the rich make zero surplus in all periods. Consider a special case where 
. Then Bt grows at a rate r < r2 in every period so that the borrowing 
constraint (and the resource constraint as well) never binds.
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Note however that there may be other equilibria where Bt and/or Dt grow at rates 
that are not constant and satisfy (15). But we restrict attention to balanced growth paths.
For the case (ii), when r2 < r:
Note that due to the resource constraint,20 the price ratio  is bounded above 
by r2 in the limit for →∞ . Since r2 < r,
20 Recall that the resource constraint is  and .
WTBR (7) implies  so that even though we have binding WTBR,
Since we obtain a contradiction, this means that for r2 < r, there cannot exist a 
balanced bubble equilibrium.
Thus, consider an equilibrium where the price is constant, ptR = pR*. Then, from 
WTBR, it must be that . However, due to competition,  cannot 
be an equilibrium, since otherwise a young agent can pay pR*+ϵ and obtain the 
asset for sure. Thus, the equilibrium must be such that WTBR binds (agents obtain 
no surplus). The price is thus equal to the fundamental value in all periods.
The only difference between (ii)(a) and (ii)(b) is the maximum borrowing 
considering the default cut-off. Formally, at steady state, no default becomes 
B* ≥ rB* - A
(16)
Note that agents have a continuum of choices between borrowing and down 
payment. This is due to rich agents having two choice variables and the cost of 
borrowing being the same as the opportunity cost of consumption in the model. In 
that sense, agents are indifferent between borrowing less and consuming less today 
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21 To understand this point clearly and formally. Consider an equilibrium for case (ii)(a). For the 
given equilibrium price  consider two strategies where a young pays  at 
time t and borrows ,  vs. a young pays D=FR from the endowment and borrows nothing 
Bt=0 so that still pays same price ptR=FR. Both of these strategies are equivalent in terms of the utility 
generated. Since (8) does not bind and willingness-to-buy constraint (7) binds. When  is paid, (7) 
can be written as  whereas when A is paid and  is borrowed (7) 
can be written as . Thus as long as the resource constraint, (8) does not 
bind, there exist a continuum of equilibria,  where .
22 Actually, in the rich asset market, the price growth rate should be smaller than the growth rate of 
credit.
but repaying a lower amount tomorrow vs. borrowing more and consuming more 
today and repaying a higher amount. Since we are interested in the equilibrium 
price, this continuum of choices does not affect our argument.21
Considering the different possible cases for r2, the intuition of Lemma (4) is 
as follows. Whenever the credit growth rate is larger than the cost of borrowing, 
there exists a bubble equilibrium where prices grow steadily and agents who hold 
an asset enjoy a positive surplus. This is due to the fact that the price fetched in 
the second period of life (when agents are old) is higher than the repayment to the 
bank.
Whenever the credit growth rate is smaller than the borrowing rate, 
r2 < r, borrowing is not sustainable. Since price growth would be smaller than the 
borrowing rate,22 a bubble could not be sustained, since agents would not be able 
to pay back their debt. Thus, the only equilibrium is a steady state where the rich 
asset is traded at the fundamental price.
Also note that when the initial credit limit is small and the endowment A is 
large, there exist bubble equilibria where the rich experience zero surplus.
Lemma 5 As a special case, when r2=r, in the rich asset market any borrowing 
level  with prices ptR*=Bt+D* and  is an equilibrium 
where Bt+1=rBt and
• D* = FR for A ≥ FR and WTBR binds, i.e., the young who hold an asset get no 
excess surplus
• D* = A for A < FR and WTBR is slack, i.e., the young who hold an asset get excess 
surplus.
Proof. The poof is similar to case (i) in Lemma 4; the only difference is that 
WTBR binds for A ≥ FR.
Proposition 1 Suppose [A1], [A2], and [A3] hold. An equilibrium of this 
economy consists of price pairs  and borrowing levels Btj* for both asset 
markets j ∈ {R,P} and a downpayment D* for the rich such that,
i. if credit growth is fast, i.e., r2 ≥ r:
a) in the poor asset market, there exists an equilibrium where agents borrow 
up to the maximum  and . Poor agents who hold 
an asset obtain a positive surplus
b) in the poor asset market, there also exits a steady state with price ptP=0 in 
all periods
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c) in the rich asset market, if  or if A ≥ FR, r2 > r and  is 
sufficiently large, then there exist balanced bubble equilibria such 
that the maximum amount is borrowed , and rich agents 
who hold an asset obtain a positive surplus (WTBR(13) is slack). The 
price is , implying that the resource constraint (8) binds. 
If A ≥ FR, then there also exist bubble equilibria where the rich agents obtain 
no surplus in all periods, i.e., WTBR(13) binds
d) in the rich asset market, there also exists a steady state with price 
, ∀t.
ii. if credit growth is smaller than the borrowing rate r2 < r, then
a) in the poor asset market there exists a unique steady state with price ptP*=0, ∀t.
b) in the rich asset market, there exists a steady state (no bubble) where 
the asset is traded at the fundamental: i.e., , ∀t and (11) 
(WTBR) binds.
Proof. See proof of Lemmas 2 and 4 above.
When r2 > r, in the poor asset market, the only alternative to a bubble equilibrium 
is an equilibrium where the asset is severely underpriced, i.e., ptP=0 in all periods. 
In contrast, in the rich asset market, there exist equilibria where the price is equal 
to the fundamental. If the young rich expect no price growth, they will pay pt=FR. 
Thus, expectations are crucial in the equilibrium selection.
An interesting observation following from Proposition 1 is that, while the poor 
always obtain positive surplus in a bubble equilibrium (even though in the steady 
state), this is not generally true for the rich.
Note also that when credit growth is fast, rich agents also have an incentive 
to purchase the poor asset to speculate on price growth (even if they derive no 
intrinsic utility from the poor asset). However, considering [A2], the rich cannot 
drive the prices in the poor asset market. As for the rich asset market, since the rich 
can rely on their endowment and value the rich asset more than the poor, they can 
always price out poor agents since the poor cannot provide a down payment.23
Comparing the two types of equilibria (I).(a) and (I).(b), the poor are better off 
when there is a bubble in the poor asset market.
Proposition 2 For a given credit growth rate r2>r, in any bubble equilibrium 
such that the resource constraint binds, the bubble grows faster in the poor market 
compared to the rich market.
Proof. Compare the two bubbles in the poor and rich asset markets. For the 
poor asset,  and . This implies that the bubble grows 
at the rate r2. For the rich market,  and . 
However, this means the growth rate of the bubble is less than r2 in the rich market, 
since D > 0.
23 Note that this depends on the nature of the contract for the rich. If the contract requires a down 
payment, then the poor can never buy a rich house. If the contract requires no down payment, then 
we need to consider a scenario where the price of the poor asset grows faster than that of the rich 
asset. For example, if the price of the rich asset grows at r2 (for the case r2>r) and the price of the rich 
asset grows at rate r, at some point the poor asset will become more expensive. Thus, we need to 
assume that the price of the poor asset at any period is bounded by the price of the rich asset.
Subprime Mortgages and Lending Bubbles 209
The intuition of this result is simple. Since the rich can pay from their 
endowment, when there is a bubble in the rich market the price grows slower 
compared to the poor market. This result matches the empirical observations 
given in Figures 1 and 2.
Several assumptions of the model must be discussed. First, the zero-wealth 
assumption for the poor simply allows us to present the main idea of this paper 
in a starker manner. A model where the poor also have some initial wealth, albeit 
significantly smaller than the wealth of the rich, would generate similar results.
Second, when r2 > r, i.e., the credit growth rate is larger than the cost of 
borrowing, there exist ever growing bubbles in both markets. Considering the 
limited resources, these bubbles cannot be sustained forever, since at some point 




To illustrate some possible consequences of underpricing, consider an environment 
where the stock of houses depreciates over time at rate λ∈(0,1). More precisely, 
if no new houses are built in period t,  Suppose also that there is a 
producer of houses who can replenish the stock provided that the market price 
is above the marginal cost. We assume that the producer is a price taker (i.e., can 
only sell at market price) and has a constant marginal cost  of producing a type 
j house, j∈{P,R}. Assume
Assumption [A4]. 0 < cP < cR ≤ FR
For simplicity, we restrict attention to the case where the total supply of houses 
cannot exceed an upper bound . For instance, this might be the case if there are 
building restrictions that limit the amount of land available for building. Similar 
to the previous sections, we assume
Clearly enough, whatever the price at time t, an old agent selling his property 
will receive only λptj. We compare two types of equilibrium: a bubble where the 
borrowing limit is binding and an equilibrium with no bubble. In general, the 
surplus generated by the transactions in market j∈{P,R} at time t+1 is:
(17)
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where Δ ≥ 0 denotes production at time t+1. (Note that the total surplus (17) does 
not include the banks’ surplus, since credit is modeled in a reduced form. This is 
however consistent with the competitive case where banks make zero profits).
We restrict our attention to the poor asset market and consider a bubble 
equilibrium where the producer supplies  in every period, so that 
 for all t. Assume also that λ is not too small, so that λr2 > r. This implies 
that price growth allows old agents to repay their debt with the proceeds of the 
house sale. Then, (17) becomes
At the other extreme, consider now an equilibrium with no bubble (so that 
ptP=0, ∀t and no new houses enter the market). In this case, (17) becomes
(18)
Clearly enough, (18) is always larger than (19). Moreover, in the second case 
limt→∞ Wt=0, so that the total surplus would converge to zero in the long run. It is 
also clear that, while a bubble equilibrium may also generate a higher surplus in 
the rich market, so long as cR ≤ FR, the supply of rich assets will never go to zero 
in the long run (so that limt→∞ Wt > 0). This is because the price of the rich asset is 
bounded below by the fundamental FR.24
Proposition 3 Suppose Assumption [A4] holds. Then, comparing an 
equilibrium without a bubble (r2 < r) to an equilibrium with a bubble (λr2 > r), 
welfare is higher under the bubble scenario.
B. Change in LTV Policy
Now, consider a scenario where the banks no longer supply 100% LTV loans. 
This would mean that the poor cannot access credit, given that they have no 
endowment. When this change is announced, there is widespread default among 
the poor, since the young generation cannot receive any credit, implying that the 
old can find no buyers. Thus, the old at the time of the announcement are unable 
to pay back their debt. It is possible to enrich the model by endogenizing lending 
to generate endogenous credit freezes.
(19)
24 Note that part of our welfare result is due to the fact that the interest rate r is fixed and does not 
respond to changed conditions.
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VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Credit-fueled bubbles, where the price is above the fundamental, may sometimes 
make poor agents better off compared to a scenario without a bubble, where the 
poor asset would be significantly underpriced. For example, consider a scenario 
where the poor with access to good investment opportunities need to take 
a short-term loan. If house prices are high (overvalued), the poor may be able 
to collateralize the house and borrow, whereas if their houses are significantly 
underpriced, they may not be able to access credit at all. This argument is similar 
to Tirole (1985), who argues that even if bubbles crowd out total investment, they 
can still improve the flow and allocation of funds through relaxing the borrowing 
constraint for investors with a good investment opportunity, that is, the bubble 
can lead to a Pareto improvement.
In terms of policy, our results suggest that there may be scope for market 
interventions aimed at sustaining the value of the assets held by credit-constrained 
agents after the burst of a credit bubble.
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Figure 1. Case–Shiller Home Price Index (High vs Low Tier) for San Francisco, 
California
The figure shows the trend in the Case-Shiller home price index (high vs low tier) for California (1994 to 2016).
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The figure shows the trend in the Case-Shiller home price index (high vs low tier) for Miami, Florida (1994 to 2016).
The figure shows the trend in the Case-Shiller home price index (high vs low tier) for Los Angeles, California (1994 to 2016).
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Figure 8. Case-Shiller Home Price Index (High vs Low Tier) for New York
Home Price Index (High Tier) for New York, New York©
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Figure 9. Case-Shiller Home Price Index (High vs Low Tier) for Tampa, Florida
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The figure shows the trend in the Case-Shiller home price index (high vs low tier) for New York (1994 to 2016).
The figure shows the trend in the Case-Shiller home price index (high vs low tier) for Tampa, Florida (1994 to 2016).
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Figure 10. Case-Shiller National, 10-City and 20-City Home Price Indices for the USA
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Lemma 6 Suppose [A3] is violated  , then the equilibrium in the rich 
market is similar to that of the poor market.
i. If r2 ≥ r, then there exists an equilibrium  where D*=A<FR. ICR  does 
not bind and (8) binds, i.e the rich obtain a positive surplus from purchasing 
the asset.
ii. If r2 < r, then the rich borrow in equilibrium , and equilibrium 
price is .
Proof. The proof is similar to Lemma 2. For part (ii) the only difference from 
the poor is any price smaller than the endowment can be satisfied as equilibrium, 
and no agent borrows. The intuition is similar to Lemma 2, when the credit growth 
is smaller than the cost of borrowing, rich agents have an upper limit for the 
borrowing which is determined by the binding no default condition. Thus, the 
asset is traded below fundamental value since  since .  
The figure shows the trend in the Case-Shiller National, 10-City and 20-City Home Price Indices for the USA (1994 to 2016).
